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1 Introduction
Ever since Akerlof (1970) economists are concerned with asymmetric information as a signi-
ficant friction in economic interactions, severely impeding the implementation of efficient
outcomes. In response, institutions are established whose major role lies in reducing
informational asymmetries. Examples range from auditors verifying financial statements
of companies to certifiers asserting the (hidden) quality of products. The value of these
institutions rests on their credibility to truthfully reveal the information they observe. In this
paper we are concerned with collusion as one potential threat to credibility and as a hindrance
to implementation.1 A privately informed party may seek to bribe the intermediary to forge
reports, e.g. paying an auditor to conceal unfavorable evidence or a certifier for releasing
favorable product information. Is it possible to design institutions that give intermediaries
incentives to reveal all their information truthfully, while at the same time making them
resistant to the threat of collusion?
Addressing the issue of collusion in the framework of mechanism design is not straightfor-
ward. A comprehensive analysis of the (detrimental) effects of collusion requires considering
all conceivable mechanisms, i.e. all institutional frameworks. In standard mechanism design
the revelation principle facilitates this task, by allowing to focus on incentive compatible
direct mechanisms. However, collusion introduces cooperative aspects and thus precludes
invoking a revelation principle. The previous literature tacitly invokes a (quasi) revelation
principle: a mechanism merely asks for reports on the initially observed information. These
restrictions for instance ignore additional information such as the knowledge about collusive
agreements.2
In this paper we use a more general class of mechanisms that not only asks the players for
reports on their information but also provides them with discriminatory information. The
latter feature endogenously creates (additional) asymmetric information between the possibly
colluding parties. We show that an appropriate design of the mechanism, in particular
designing the information structure and monetary payments, allows to completely overcome
1The threat of collusion is documented both empirically and theoretically. According to IMF (2016) annual
bribes exchanged worldwide exceed US $1 trillion. The theoretical literature on collusive supervision started with
Tirole (1986), the literature review below provides a comprehensive overview.
2The few exceptions include Chen and Micali (2012), who allow for richer message spaces: agents are also
asked which coalition they belong to. Similar to our approach, Ortner and Chassang (2018) use mechanisms that
create endogenous asymmetric information, but in a setting with moral hazard and incomplete contracts. See the
literature review below for a more detailed account.
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collusion: any outcome that is implementable were the third party information credible can
also be implemented when the third party is prone to colluding.
Our model builds on and extends existing models of collusive supervision, as initiated by
Tirole (1986). There is a privately informed agent and a supervisor who receives a (possibly
noisy) signal on the agent’s information. The agent derives utility from the implemented
alternative and monetary transfers, while the supervisor only cares about money. We are
interested in implementing social choice functions (SCF), mapping states of the world into
outcomes. The benchmark is given by the scenario where the supervisor’s signal is public.
Our main result shows, first, that any SCF which is implementable under such direct
supervision is also implementable under collusive supervision, i.e. if the designer cannot
observe the signal and covert side agreements between the agent and the supervisor are
possible. Second, implementation does not require net payments to the supervisor and
hence does not bring additional costs vis-à-vis the benchmark. Neither agent nor supervisor
receive an extra information rent stemming from their possibility to collude and the signal
hence is extracted for free.
We prove this result by constructing a mechanism which endogenously creates asymmetric
information between agent and supervisor, thus driving a wedge between the collusive parties.
Collusion, after all, is a bilateral bargaining problem regarding the reports to be sent to the
grand mechanism. It has been noted in the literature that asymmetric information makes
bargaining more difficult, up to a complete failure of reaching an agreement. While this effect
is detrimental in the used car market of Akerlof (1970), it is good news in the case of collusive
side bargaining. Our mechanism provides the supervisor with payoff relevant information
she holds privately vis-à-vis the agent. This is achieved by randomizing the transfers to
agent as well as supervisor and, in addition, sending a private signal to the supervisor on the
realization of these transfers. At the collusion stage, this induces a bargaining situation with
interdependent valuations. The agent does not know whether he faces a ‘lemon’ supervisor,
who is easy to bribe but unattractive to collude with – or whether he faces a ‘cream puff’,
where collusion is highly attractive since a forged report strongly increases payments. The
grand mechanism we construct this way renders side bargaining basically impossible: any
side mechanism which specifies reports other than truthtelling can not at the same time be
incentive compatible, individually rational and ex-ante budget balanced. We thus induce
the desired non-cooperative Bayesian Nash equilibrium as the unique feasible outcome of
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any collusive agreement.
The practical implementation of our mechanisms requires two aspects: randomization
and differential information. First, regarding randomization, the mechanisms we propose
do not differ from stochastic mechanisms as analyzed in contract theory and mechanism
design. Many real-life processes of supervision are subject to randomness, such as auditors
only checking random samples of the managerial data. Second, we introduce endogenous
asymmetric information. Most audit scenarios provide scope for such a differential distribu-
tion of knowledge: a manager may know the auditor’s general wage structure but not her
specific wage class, he may be unaware whether the auditor was randomly sent for a general
investigation or whether certain data triggered the search for specific information, and in a
firm with several managerial divisions he may not even realize whether he himself is subject
to the audit or one of the other managers. Each of these scenarios precludes the manager
from exact knowledge of an optimal bribing level and hence impedes collusion.
The results we present are robust to various changes. We can incorporate standard
assumptions on the supervisor’s utility function, in particular risk aversion and limited
liability as well as voluntary participation. If these constraints become severe – e.g. by
precluding any ex post extractions from the supervisor –, we can still virtually implement
the direct supervision benchmark: by providing incentive payments in some of the contracts
offered to the players and having the probabilities of these contracts go to zero, the mechanism
designer can obtain the desired information with rent payments vanishing in the limit. The
same robustness holds for changes to the timing, where the supervisor decides on participation
in the grand mechanism after having obtained her private signal which is used to create an
asymmetry between herself and the agent.
Our results have further implications for the theory of collusive supervision: first, we add
to the debate on delegated vs. centralized contracting in a hierarchy prone to collusion. The
mechanism we propose is necessarily centralized and delegation is strictly dominated. When
using only direct mechanisms, Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003) demonstrate that the optimal
mechanism can be implemented via delegation to the supervisor. We also contribute to the
question as to whether such a restriction to direct mechanism is in fact appropriate in the
presence of collusion: as argued above, the literature has – with only few exceptions – tacitly
invoked a revelation principle by only considering mechanisms where agent and supervisor
are asked to report their information. As a result, collusion was thought to be costly in that
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it limits the set of implementable social choice functions and gives rise to information rents
to the supervisor. Our results imply that these findings are the result of an undue restriction
on the class of permitted mechanisms, not a consequence of collusion per se. Finally, we
add to the analysis on optimal supervisory information. Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003) as well
as Asseyer (2018) argue that an imperfectly informed supervisor is preferable: the value
of supervisory information increases in informativeness, but the collusive rents are higher
the better informed the supervisor is. However, we show that using appropriate non-direct
mechanisms the supervisory signal can be extracted for free. Hence, a more informative
signal is always beneficial.
Further implications regard collusive settings where there exists ex-ante two-sided asym-
metric information, such as in auctions: in our setting, there initially only is one-sided
asymmetry in that the agent has an informational advantage over the supervisor. In an
auction setting, however, there may be several agents, each possessing private information
e.g. on the value of the object to be auctioned. It is an avenue for further research to analyze
how our results extend to such mechanism design problems.
The paper proceeds as follows: after reviewing the literature in Section 2, we present a
toy example in Section 3, illustrating the notion of non-direct mechanisms we propose. The
full model is introduced in Section 4. In Section 5 we present our main results, including
a comparison of collusive supervision to the benchmark of direct supervision. Section 6
extends the baseline model into various dimensions, such as risk aversion, limited liability or
participation constraints. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to three strands of literature on the theory of collusion. First, we add
to the analysis of collusion in vertical hierarchies, comprised of a principal–supervisor–agent
framework. Second, we shed further light on the use of mechanism design in the context
of collusion and, in particular, on the (non-)applicability of the revelation principle under
cooperative play. Third, we exploit the mechanism designer’s possibility to endogenously
create asymmetric information and thus add to previous work doing so. We discuss each
strand in more detail.
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Tirole (1986) introduces the three-tier principal–supervisor–agent model as the workhorse
model for studying collusion in organizations. In such a hierarchy the agent has some private
information, and the supervisor has more information on the agent than the principal. The
focus lies on the transmission of information from the supervisor to the principal, when
collusion between agent and supervisor is possible. Tirole shows that supervision is beneficial
despite collusion, but collusion gives rise to additional distortions (both productive and
rents).
The subsequent literature studies variations and extensions of Tirole’s model. Kofman
and Lawarrée (1993), Kofman and Lawarrée (1996a), Kessler (2004) and Burlando and
Motta (2015) keep Tirole’s assumption of hard evidence, i.e. evidence can only be concealed
and not forged. Another strand studies collusion with soft supervisory information, where
parties can claim any realized signal, e.g. Baliga (1999), Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003),
Celik (2009), and Asseyer (2018). In almost all contributions collusion is shown to be
detrimental. Only Kessler (2004) and Burlando and Motta (2015) provide instances where
collusion can be overcome, but their results crucially depend on the fact that supervisors
learn their information – and thus send their reports – only after the agent communicated.3
Throughout, this literature focuses on mechanisms where the agent and the supervisor send
reports only. In contrast, we allow for a richer class of mechanisms and show that collusion
can be prevented at no cost irrespective of the timing of information, preferences of the
players and the properties of supervisory information (hard vs soft).
The problem of collusion has also attracted much attention for general mechanism
design problems. Already Green and Laffont (1979) point out that Vickrey–Clarke–Groves
mechanisms are vulnerable against coalition formation.4 Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2000)
provide analyses of specific mechanism design problems with independent and correlated
information, concluding implementability is limited in the presence of collusion. Che and
Kim (2006) address the problem of collusion in a general mechanism design setting, showing
that collusion is not an issue when the agents’ information is independent. For a given
mechanism that yields revenue R absent collusion, they construct a new mechanism by
re-designing payments such that revenue is constant at R, irrespective of whether and
which coalition between the agents forms. Their results continue to hold for correlated
3Their results also depend on the agent’s preferences which have to satisfy a single crossing property.
4See also Crémer (1996) and Chen and Micali (2012).
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information—as is necessarily the case in our model of supervision—but only when there
are at least three agents and only with respect to the grand coalition.
We complement the analysis of Che and Kim (2006) by showing there exist mechanisms
that prevent collusion even in models with correlated information and only two players.
While Che and Kim embrace collusion via making the mechanism designer indifferent
as to whether collusion takes place, our construction aims at making it impossible for
the agent and the supervisor to form a coalition in the first place. Both approaches use
asymmetric information as a friction in side bargaining. As Che and Kim (2006) show, with
independent information these frictions prevent any coalition from reaching outcomes that
cannot be obtained in the absence of collusion. With correlated information the players
have an informational advantage over the designer, requiring the addition of informational
asymmetries to break collusion. Doing so requires using mechanisms that go beyond those
usually employed in mechanism design – with Chen and Micali (2012) being an exception,
as argued above –, where informed parties only report their information.
Finally, there is a small literature using mechanisms that endogenously create asymmetric
information between agents. Rahman and Obara (2010) exploit this in the team problem
with moral hazard and budget-balanced payments. They introduce a mediator who sends
confidential recommendations to the group members, and condition transfers directly on
these recommendations. As in our mechanism, after receiving their recommendations agents
are asymmetrically informed as to the consequences of their actions. Strausz (2012) relates
these mediated contracts back to the revelation principle. Rahman (2012) studies the
problem of providing a monitor with incentives to actually monitor. A mediated mechanism,
secretly recommending the agent to sometimes shirk, provides the monitor with incentives.
Rahman’s mechanism is prone to collusion: agent and monitor may side contract to report
false evidence. Combining his construction with ours yields a mechanism that both provides
the monitor with incentives to monitor and at the same prevents collusion.
In a setting more closely related to ours, Ortner and Chassang (2018) prove the benefit
of creating endogenous asymmetric information when fighting collusion. They randomize
the supervisor’s wage and provide only the supervisor – not the agent – with information on
the realization. The colluding parties therefore have different expectations on the value of
collusion. As a result, the agent does not know the bribe required to corrupt the supervisor
and an informational friction impedes their side bargaining. However, we depart from this
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model in several ways. Most importantly, the authors use a setting of moral hazard and
incomplete contracts: while the detection of collusion only affects the supervisor’s wage
(and not the agent’s), the agent’s choice is only relevant for his own payoff (and not the
supervisor’s). That is, transfers specified by the contract do not allow for a full mechanism
design approach in that they are not contingent on all of the reports or observables. As a
result, the authors cannot exploit the full interdependence of valuations that we use in the
present paper, where the private information sent to the supervisor is payoff-relevant for
both of the collusive parties. In their model, collusion therefore remains costly, though they
can reduce these costs by the use of randomized wages. The randomized mechanism we
propose, however, fully mitigates the costs of collusion by randomizing not only over wages,
but over whole mechanisms instead.
3 Illustrative Example
Consider a company that wants to build a new branch but requires a manager to do so.
There are two possible locations, x1 and x2, and two possible states of the world, θ1 and θ2.
The company would like to implement a specific social choice function (SCF) (x, t) which
pins down a location xi and a transfer ti to the manager for each state θi. In particular,
it seeks to build the branch at the location matching the state without paying a rent to
the supervisor: xi = θi and t ≡ 0. The manager has idiosyncratic preferences given by the




If the state θ is publicly known, this SCF can readily be implemented since the manager
receives his outside option and has no private information. The same holds true if the
company cannot observe the state directly but hires a supervisor who honestly reports it:
since the supervisor – as opposed to the manager – does not gain utility from the chosen
location, she reports the state truthfully. Matters become more intricate if the manager can
bribe the supervisor to make a false report. Is the implementation of the SCF impeded by
the possibility of collusion?
Most of the literature focuses on what we later define as deterministic contracts : both
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the manager and the supervisor are merely asked for a report on the sate of the world, which
pins down a chosen location x, a transfer t to the manager and a wage w to the supervisor.
In equilibrium they report truthfully5 and we can thus denote by (ti, wi) the payments given
a joint report θi on the state. Now if the true state is θ1, the manager may offer a bribe b to
the supervisor such that they jointly report θ2 instead. The agent will offer a bribe of at
most b ≤ t2 − t1 + 10, while the supervisor will require at least b ≥ w1 − w2. A necessary
condition for the contract to induce truthelling hence is that no bribe exists which meets
both of these requirements, i.e. we need t2 − t1 + 10 < w1 − w2. The same logic applies in
state θ2. Adding the respective truthelling constraint to the one just derived yields 20 < 0, a
contradiction. Hence, no simple contract exists which implements the SCF (x, t) introduced
above.
We now propose a more general mechanism which achieves the task of implementing
(x, t). We again denote by (ti, wi) the payments given a joint report θi. Consider a menu of
simple contracts given by Γ = {γ0, γ1, γ2}, where
γ0 γ1 γ2
t1, w1 22,−11 −22, 11 0, 0
t2, w2 22,−11 0, 0 −22, 11
Assume each contract is equally likely and penalties are large for non-unanimous reports on
θ. Crucially, the supervisor is informed which of the three contracts is realized (after she
has accepted to participate), while the manager is not. When choosing their reports and
considering collusion, they therefore face asymmetric information.
It is readily verified that neither manager nor supervisor have an incentive to unilaterally
deviate, and that in expectation both receive their outside option of zero when reporting
truthfully. In particular, E[t|θi] = 0 is satisfied for all i. Is there scope for collusion, i.e. a
coordinated misreport? Suppose we are in state θ1, and the manager offers a bribe b to the
supervisor for jointly reporting state θ2. A bribe b < −11 is never accepted by the supervisor,
and thus not a threat. Bribes b ∈ (−11, 0) are only accepted by the supervisor of ‘type’ γ2, i.e.









(12+b) < 0. Next consider bribes b ∈ (0, 11).
Both the γ0- and the γ2-supervisor find such bribes acceptable. The manager’s expected









5A version of the collusion-proofness principle applies here, see Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003).
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Lastly, consider bribes b > 11, which all supervisor-types accept. The expected profit is
1
3
(10 + 22) + 1
3
(10 + 0) + 1
3
(10− 22)− b = 10− b < 0.
Hence, there is no bribe that manager and supervisor can agree on to coordinate their
misreport. As we show in this paper, this impossibility extends to more general forms of
collusion: there is nor side mechanism which is ex-ante budget balanced, acceptable for
both manager and supervisor and different from truthful reporting. Using more general
mechanisms than mere deterministic contracts allows the firm to fully overcome collusion.
4 Model
The basic setting. There is a single agent with type θ ∈ Θ = {θ1, . . . , θn}. The agent’s
preferences over alternatives x ∈ X and monetary transfers t ∈ R are given by
UA(x, t, θ) = u(x, θ) + t. (1)
We shall make no restrictions on the function u(·, ·), other than it being real-valued. The set
X of alternatives is arbitrary as well.6 Additive separability and risk-neutrality with respect
to monetary payments are crucial assumptions as will become clear from our analysis. They
are, however, standard in the literature on collusion theory.
In addition to the agent’s type θ there is a second piece of information – the signal
τ ∈ T = {τ1, . . . , τm}. This signal is payoff-irrelevant in that it does not (directly) enter the
agent’s utility function. However, it may contain information about the agent’s type. We
allow for arbitrary correlation between θ and τ . Formally, the prior is given by
πij = Pr(θ = θi, τ = τj), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m. (2)
We assume full support, i.e. for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n there is a j such that πij > 0, and vice versa.
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From the unconditional distribution we deduce the conditional distribution of the agent’s
type given the signal. Let πji denote the probability that the agent’s type is θi conditional
6In particular we require neither compactness nor convexity.
7The full support assumptions rules out redundant types and signals, and is thus a mere matter of convenience.
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on the realized signal τ = τj . From Bayes’ rule we have
πji = Pr(θ = θi|τ = τj) =
πij
π1j + . . .+ πnj
. (3)
We are interested in implementing social choice functions
(x, t) : Θ× T → X × R, (4)
mapping the agent’s type θ and the signal τ into a decision x(θ, τ) ∈ X and a monetary
transfer to the agent t(θ, τ) ∈ R. Note that we explicitly allow the SCF to depend on the
signal τ , though the latter is not payoff-relevant for the agent. First of all, we do not rule
out payoff-relevance for outsiders, as this does not conflict with the implementation problem
itself. Second, even if an SCF conditions only on the agent’s type θ, its implementability
may well be affected by the realization of τ (e.g. the case where τ partitions the agent’s type
space Θ).
Information and Supervision. Throughout we assume only the agent observes his type
θ. Regarding the signal τ we distinguish two scenarios.
• Direct supervision: the signal τ is public.
• Collusive supervision: both a third party – the supervisor – and the agent privately
observe τ . In addition, agent and supervisor can collude, as specified below. The
supervisor’s utility only depends on the monetary wage w ∈ R she receives,
US(x,w, θ) = w. (5)
Hence, the supervisor has no intrinsic motive to misreport information, in particular
the signal τ is also irrelevant for the supervisor’s payoff.8 As the supervisor does not
observe θ, we face a nested information structure: the agent’s type θ is observed only
by the agent, but neither the supervisor nor any outsider. The signal τ is observed
both by the agent and the supervisor, but not by anyone else. Hence, the agent has
private information vis-à-vis the supervisor, and both the supervisor and the agent
have private information vis-à-vis any outsider or the mechanism designer.
8Hence, collusion is the only reason for why the supervisor misreports the signal she observes. We discuss the
issue of an interested supervisor – whose payoff may depend on x, θ and τ – in Section 6.4.1.
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Mechanisms. In order to implement an SCF (x, t), we can construct arbitrary mecha-
nisms, each corresponding to an extensive form game. Depending on the scenario described
above, this game is played by the agent alone (in the scenario of direct supervision) or by
both agent and supervisor (in the scenario of collusive supervision). In the latter case, the
possibility of cooperation prevents us from invoking a revelation principle.9 We are thus left
with the universe of mechanisms to choose from. Nevertheless, to prove our main results it
will turn out that it is without loss to confine attention to a limited class of mechanisms.
We distinguish between grand mechanisms on the one hand, used to implement an SCF as
explained above, and side mechanisms on the other hand, governing collusion as introduced
below. In the following we describe two classes of grand mechanisms: deterministic contracts
and one-sided randomized menus.
Definition 1. A deterministic contract γ = (x, t, w) consists of
(i) a mapping x : Θ× T × T → X , which maps every report vector into an alternative,
(ii) a mapping t : Θ× T × T → R, which maps every report vector into a payment to (or
from, if negative) the agent, and
(iii) a mapping w : Θ× T × T → R, which maps every report vector into a payment to (or
from, if negative) the supervisor.
A deterministic contract γ asks the agent to report a type and a signal, and the supervisor
to report a signal. For each report vector, γ specifies an alternative and payments. In
the absence of collusion there would be no loss of generality in restricting the mechanism
designer to the use of deterministic mechanisms because both the agent and the supervisor
are risk-neutral with respect to monetary payments, and randomization over alternatives x
is incorporated by having X also contain lotteries over deterministic alternatives.
We emphasize the following notation: bold characters denote a social choice function,
see x and t in eq. (4), mapping the state space Θ× T into an alternative and a payment to
the agent, respectively. Non-bold characters x and t denote the elements of a deterministic
contract, where the domain is given by the set of report profiles Θ × T × T instead, see
Definition 1. When we analyze the implementability of a social choice function (x, t) below,
9As discussed by Laffont and Martimort (2000), a revelation principle in a setting with collusion would have
to include the possibility for asking the agents which side mechanism they are playing. On top of that, the
mechanism would give recommendations which side mechanism to form. Consequently, invoking a revelation
principle does not give rise to a tractable framework.
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we effectively ask if there is a contract γ = (x, t, w) that supports it.10
The second class of grand mechanisms is defined as follows.
Definition 2. A one-sided randomized menu (Γ, q) consists of
(i) a (finite) set Γ = {γ1, . . . , γk} of deterministic contracts, and
(ii) a probability distribution q ∈ ∆(Γ), where q(γi) > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
11
with the following timing:
(1) a deterministic contract γ′ is selected from Γ according to q,
(2) the supervisor gets privately informed of the selected deterministic contract γ′, and
(3) the agent reports a type and a signal, and the supervisor reports a signal. The report
vector determines the outcome according to γ′.
One important assumption we make is that the supervisor receives no information that
is verifiable vis-à-vis the agent. For example, a supervisor’s contract may entail several
wage classes, but the actual wage is not written into the contract, though known to the
supervisor. All details of a one-sided randomized menu are common knowledge: the agent
knows that the deterministic contracts are drawn according to q from the menu Γ, and that
the supervisor knows the realization; the supervisor knows that the agent knows and so
on. Mechanisms of this kind, which are random and reveal only parts to its agents, have
been previously employed in problems of moral hazard, for instance by Rahman and Obara
(2010) and Rahman (2012).
Collusion. The vast majority of work on mechanism design assumes that agents act
non-cooperatively when ‘playing’ the mechanism. We want to challenge this assumption by
allowing the agent and the supervisor to coordinate their reports to the grand mechanism.
Formally, we model collusion taking place when the agent and the supervisor decide about
their reporting strategies. Collusion describes the formation of a side contract that commits
players to a particular reporting strategy and the exchange of monetary payments. Given
10We do not include the wage w paid to the supervisor in the notation of a SCF (x, t) since we are interested in
comparing the implementability of such SCFs under ‘direct supervision’ (where the signal τ is public and hence
neither a supervisor nor a wage w is required) to the scenario of collusive supervision, where the wage is used as
an auxiliary mean to implement (x, t). We will nevertheless address the question whether this implementation
causes additional costs, i.e. rent payment E[w] > 0 to the supervisor.
11The assumption p(γi) > 0 for all i is clearly without loss. It avoids cases where the menu contains redundant
items.
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the above definition of grand mechanisms, there are two sources of private information at
the collusion stage. First, the agent knows his type, thus has (residual) private information
vis-à-vis the supervisor. Second, in a one-sided randomized menu, the supervisor in turn
also has private information vis-à-vis the agent: she knows the selected simple contract, and
thus the exact payoffs following each joint report. The signal realization τ , on the other
hand, is common knowledge between the agent and the supervisor, though unknown to any
outsider and thus to the grand mechanism.
We want to allow arbitrary formations of a side mechanism, thus modeling collusion
in the most general way possible and to the largest hindrance of implementing social
choice functions. We therefore follow Laffont and Martimort (1997) in assuming that a
disinterested third party proposes a collusive side mechanism Γc.12 Without loss of generality
we can focus on direct side mechanisms in which all parties report their private information
truthfully. Formally, as side mechanism is described by Γc =
(
Θ,Γ, o): the agent reports
a type θ′ ∈ Θ, the supervisor reports a simple contract γ′ ∈ Γ, and the outcome function
o : Θ × Γ → ∆(Θ × T × T ) × R × R determines the (potentially random) joint report
to the grand mechanism (θa, τa, τ s) and monetary side-payments to the agent and the
supervisor. We assume players have no access to outside sources of money, and therefore
restrict side-payments to be ex-ante balanced-budget, i.e. the expected sum of side payments
is non-positive. Hence, we allow for burning money and ex-post imbalances in the side
mechanism’s budget. Lastly, no player can be forced to enter a side mechanism. Note that
the outside option is endogenous: it is given by the (expected) payoff from playing the
grand mechanism non-cooperatively. At this point we shall also assume passive beliefs after
unilateral rejection of the side mechanism, i.e. players do not update their beliefs about the
other after an unanticipated rejection of the side mechanism. To summarize, collusive side
mechanisms are direct mechanisms that are incentive compatible, ex-ante budget balanced,
and satisfy individual rationality, i.e. voluntary participation.
Timing. When a one-sided randomized menu is used and collusion is possible, events
unfold as follows (if a deterministic contract is used instead, stage 2 below is obsolete, hence
the timing with a deterministic contract is the special case consisting only of stages 1, 3–5):
1. Nature draws (θ, τ) and informs the agent about θ, and both the supervisor and the
12Note this in particular includes take-it-or-leave-it offer from either of the collusive parties.
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agent about τ .
2. Nature draws γ′ from Γ according to q, and confidentially reveals γ′ to the supervisor.
3. A third party offers side contract Γc, and players simultaneously decide whether to
participate. If at least one player rejects we move directly to stage 5, otherwise to
stage 4.
4. Players submit their reports to the side mechanism, determining a joint report and
the exchange of side payments.
5. Both the agent and the supervisor send their reports to the grand mechanism (in
case of an effective side-contract the reports determined therein), and the allocation is
determined according to γ′.
5 Analysis
In this section we present our main result on the implementability of social choice functions
under collusive supervision. Two benchmark cases – direct supervision and non-collusive
supervision – provide the foundation for our main result, which is presented in Proposition 1.
At the end of this section we use the special case of a fully informative signal to provide
a particular illustration of our main results: we compare the set of implementable SCFs
when imposing a restriction to deterministic contracts to the case when no such restriction
is made.
5.1 Direct Supervision
Let us first consider the case of direct supervision, where the signal τ is publicly observable.
In this case, there is no need for third-party supervision, because the supervisor cannot
provide additional information. Hence, we focus on mechanisms that elicit the agent’s
(residual) private information from his knowledge of θ, but ignore the supervisor.
Given that τ is public, a mechanism can condition on the realized signal. Furthermore,
we can invoke a revelation principle and focus without loss of generality on direct mechanisms
in which the agent truthfully reports his type. A social choice function (x, t) can be directly
associated with a direct mechanism, which asks the agent to report a type θ′ and determines
an allocation using the reported type and the publicly observable signal τ according to
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(x, t). Note that a direct mechanism allows the agent to report only types that have strictly
positive probability under the realized signal, i.e. the report set after signal realization τ is
Θ(τ) := {θ ∈ Θ|Pr(θ, τ) > 0}. To ensure truthful reporting by the agent, the usual incentive
constraints arise, as stated in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. A social choice function (x, t) is implementable under direct supervision if and
only if it is incentive compatible:
u(x(θ, τ), θ) + t(θ, τ) ≥ u(x(θ′, τ), θ) + t(θ′, τ) ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ(τ) ∀τ ∈ T . (6)
Note the special case of a fully informative signal. Formally, T = {τ1, . . . , τn} and πii = 1
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In this case, Θ(τi) = {θi} for all i, and thus condition (6) has no bite.
Consequently any social choice function (x, t) is implementable.13 We will return to fully
informative signals at the end of this section.
5.2 Non-collusive Supervision
As a second benchmark we briefly study non-collusive supervision: the signal τ is not
publicly known, but only observed by both the agent and the supervisor. However, for this
benchmark we rule out collusion – that is, players behave non-cooperatively.
Fix an SCF (x, t) that is implementable under direct supervision. Implementation
under non-collusive supervision exploits the fact that both the agent and the supervisor are
symmetrically informed about the signal, and that the agent has no incentives to misreport
his type provided the signal is reported truthfully. A classic way of implementing a given SCF
(x, t) (that is implementable under direct supervision) uses shoot-the-liar mechanisms.14
Such a mechanism is a deterministic contract γ, asking the agent to report his type and
the signal, and the supervisor to report the signal. If the reports on the signal coincide, the
allocation is chosen according to (x, t) using the reported signal and the agent’s reported type.
Otherwise, if reported signals are non-unanimous, some alternative x ∈ X is chosen together
with large negative monetary payments. The latter ‘penalties’ deter unilateral deviations
from truthfully reporting the signal, and implementability under direct supervision implies
13Yet, in this case participation constraints, which we do not explicitly model in this section, do constrain
feasible allocations. For an analysis including these constraints, see section Section 6.1.
14For a complete characterization of implementable SCFs in two-agent environments see Moore and Repullo
(1990).
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the agent has no incentive to misreport his type. Note that such a mechanism does not
require any payment to the supervisor in equilibrium. In fact, setting the supervisor’s wage
equal to zero for all conforming reports on the signal, and to some arbitrarily large negative
value otherwise, yields the desired implementation. The following Lemma summarizes.
Lemma 2. Any social choice function (x, t) that is implementable under direct supervision
is also implementable under non-collusive supervision without paying the supervisor, i.e.
there is a deterministic contract γ = (x, t, w) such that
x(θ, τ, τ) = x(θ, τ), t(θ, τ, τ) = t(θ, τ), and w(θ, τ, τ) = 0, (7)
and truthful reporting is an equilibrium of γ.
5.3 Collusive Supervision
We now move on to study the general setting with collusive supervision. While shoot-the-liar
mechanisms prove effective in deterring unilateral deviations, they can in general not deter
group deviations. Since τ is symmetrically known by the agent and the supervisor, any
unilateral deviation can be identified easily,15 allowing for effective punishment. Moreover,
since all unilateral deviations occur off the equilibrium path, these punishments do not
conflict with on-path implementation of the social choice function.
However, deterrence becomes more complicated with collusion. A collusive side mecha-
nisms gives players the possibility to coordinate their reports, allowing for joint deviations.
This makes it impossible to unambiguously identify all potential deviations, and using only
monetary penalties that arise off-path is not sufficient for deterring all joint deviations. In
general, ‘direct’ mechanisms struggle with this task, as has been pointed out for instance by
Che and Kim (2006), who show that a direct mechanism lacks instruments to simultaneously
deter all unilateral and all group deviations.16 But when it comes to joint deviations,
effective deterrence does not necessarily require rendering all such deviations unattractive
for all group members simultaneously. Since the group has to agree on a deviation strategy,
15Strictly speaking, it can be identified whether there was a unilateral deviation, but the deviant’s idendity
cannot be identified.
16Their approach embraces group deviations by ‘selling’ the firm to the agents. However, they state that with
only two agents (as in our model) “the transfer rule does not give a sufficient number of degrees of freedom to ‘sell
the firm to the agents’ while preserving the original incentive design of t.” (p. 1086) The solution they propose
therefore is not applicable in our setting.
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it is sufficient to drive a wedge between the colluding parties that makes it impossible to
reach such an agreement in the first place. That is, agent and supervisor should be caused
to disagree when it is profitable to collude, and how to do so. In the following we use
mechanisms that exactly achieve this goal, by making it impossible to agree on any collusive
sided-mechanism that differs from non-cooperative equilibrium play.
To this end we will use one-sided randomized menus (Γ, q), as introduced in Definition 2.
Recall that these consist of a set Γ = (γ1, . . . , γk) of deterministic contracts γi = (xi, ti, wi)
and a probability distribution q ∈ ∆(Γ), where q(γ) denotes the probability that deterministic
contract γ ∈ Γ is selected. However, their key property is one-sidedness: the supervisor
knows which deterministic contract was selected, while the agent does not. We can thus use
information design to deter joint deviations.
We are now in the position to state our main result:
Proposition 1. Any social choice function (x, t) that is implementable under direct su-
pervision is also implementable under collusive supervision without net payments to the
supervisor. Formally, for any SCF (x, t) that is implementable under direct supervision,
there is a one-sided randomized menu (Γ, q), such that
i) xi(θ, τ, τ) = x(θ, τ) for all (θ, τ) ∈ Θ× T and all i
ii)
∑
i q(γi)ti(θ, τ, τ) = t(θ, τ) for all (θ, τ) ∈ Θ× T ,
iii)
∑
i q(γi)wi(θ, τ, τ) = 0 for all (θ, τ) ∈ Θ× T ,
and that exhibits an equilibrium in which all reports are truthful, despite collusion.
Contrary to conventional wisdom about implementation in the presence of collusion,
Proposition 1 shows that collusion neither restricts implementability nor does it give rise to
additional (coalitional) information rents. In other words, despite collusion it is possible
to extract the signal τ for free and implement the SCF (x, t) as if τ was publicly known.
Our finding challenges previously obtained insights on optimal mechanisms in principal–
supervisor–agent hierarchies under the threat of collusion, for instance in Faure-Grimaud
et al. (2003), Celik (2009) and Asseyer (2018). In particular, we show that it is always better
to have a well-informed supervisor. Previous work argued that there is an interior optimum
to the precision of the signal τ , since a perfectly informative signal caused supervisor and
agent to have symmetric information, supposedly making it hard to break up their coalition.
Using our mechanism, the signal can be extracted for free and hence is more beneficial
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the more precise it is. Before providing an intuition for the proof, we make an additional
remark: our mechanism implements the desired selection of an alternative x(θ, τ) exactly,
but the payments are implemented in expectation, i.e. the agent’s ex-ante expected transfer
is t(θ, τ), and the supervisor’s ex-ante expected wage is zero.17 As before, our mechanism
uses penalties after non-conforming reports to deter unilateral deviations.
The proof of Proposition 1 proceeds as follows. For a given SCF (x, t) we first define
∆ > 0 as the largest gain the agent could receive from (mis-)reporting the information
in some state (θ, τ), claiming some other state (θ′, τ ′).18 Using ∆, we construct a menu
of deterministic contracts Γ = {γ0, γ1, . . . , γm} as follows. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m the contract γi
rewards the supervisor with a bonus ∆+ κ in case both players report signal τi, where κ is
an arbitrary positive number.19 At the same time, the agent is penalized by an amount y∆,
where y > 1 is specified in the proof. In every other case these contracts pay the supervisor
zero, and the agent according to t(·, ·). The contract γ0, on the other hand, is constructed
such that all expected payments add up to zero in case of the supervisor, and to t(θ, τ) in
case of the agent, if all deterministic contracts are equally likely. Finally, all deterministic
contracts apply sufficiently large penalties after non-conforming reports on the signal.
Now consider the one-sided randomized menu (Γ, q), where q(γi) = 1/(m + 1) as
mentioned before. First of all, penalties after non-conforming reports on the signal deter
unilateral deviations, hence there is a non-cooperative equilibrium where both the agent
and the supervisor report their information truthfully – just as in the case of non-collusive
supervision. Can collusion break this non-cooperative equilibrium? Consider a collusive
side-mechanism with side payments. Such a side mechanism asks the supervisor for a report
on the realized deterministic contract γ, and the agent for a report on his type θ. Using
the supervisor’s incentive and participation constraints, we then derive a lower bound on
the expected bribe required in any feasible side mechanism. Similarly, we derive a lower
bound for the agent’s expected bribe, using only his participation constraints. Recall that
a side mechanism cannot print money, i.e. the expected sum of bribes paid out must not
exceed zero. Adding up the two lower bounds, we then show that there is a unique side
17Here risk-neutrality with respect to monetary payments is crucial. Section 6.3 shows that our results are
robust when allowing for arbitrary risk-attitudes of the supervisor.
18Whenever ∆ ≤ 0 implementation is not an issue, as the agent himself would have an incentive to truthfully
reveal all information.
19Strictly speaking, κ can be zero. Whenever κ > 0 there is a unique feasible side-mechanism, and this side
mechanism corresponds to the non-cooperative equilibrium.
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γ1 · · · γk · · · γm γ0
w 0 · · · ∆+ κ · · · 0 −(∆ + κ)
t t(θ, τk) · · · t(θ, τk)− y∆ · · · t(θ, τk) t(θ, τk) + y∆
Table 1: Payments after joint report (θ, τk) in the respective deterministic contracts.
mechanism that is incentive compatible, individually rational and ex-ante balanced budget:
the mechanism that specifies the non-cooperative equilibrium without side payments.
Why is there no other feasible side mechanism than this one? For every signal realization
there is a contract promising the supervisor a large bonus for reporting the signal truthfully.
Thus, in order to move away from truthfulness, the side mechanism needs to promise a bribe
to the respective ‘type’ of supervisor in order to compensate her for the foregone bonus.
Here, a ‘type’ indicates the supervisor’s private, payoff-relevant information on the realized
deterministic contract γ. But this positive bribe is also attractive for the supervisor when
she knows the selected contract does not pay a bonus for reporting the true signal. The
bribe she demands is proportional to ∆+ κ and weighted by the probabilities which the side
mechanism assigns to the different report profiles. This demand level, however, outweighs
the agent’s potential gain from engaging in collusion by the mere definition of ∆.20
Another way to see this is to consider the formation of a side mechanisms as the formation
of an equilibrium bribe for reporting some τk, while the true signal is τl. Table 1 lists the
monetary payments from jointly reporting signal τk under the respective deterministic
contracts. The situation is reminiscent of Akerlof’s 1970 car market: the supervisor (aka the
seller) knows the exact payments after any joint report, while the agent (the buyer) does
not. Large bribes, higher than ∆+ κ, attract any supervisor, but are unattractive for the
agent by the definition of ∆. Intermediate bribes, 0 < b < ∆+ κ, attract all supervisors but
‘type’ γl. However, it attracts type γk which implies a penalty of size y∆ for the agent and
hence is a ‘lemon’ from the agent’s perspective, in the sense of Akerlof. For large enough
y also this bribe is thus unattractive for the agent. Similarly, negative bribes cannot be
equilibrium values. Consequently, there is no equilibrium bribe. This holds for any deviating
report, thus only truthful reports with a bribe of zero remain.21 This intuition highlights
20The factor y in the agent’s transfer stems from the fact that he updates the value of collusion conditional on
the supervisor accepting a bribe. That is, he forms a new posterior on the realized contract knowing that the
supervisor would not have accepted if the contract offering her a bonus for truthful reporting was drawn. For a
detailed analysis we refer to the formal proof.
21The result for general mechanisms mirrors an insight by Samuelson (1984), who shows that in a lemons
market there is some mechanism with a positive level of trade if and only if the there is a positive level of trade
when the uninformed party (the buyers) make price offers.
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the resemblance to the lemons problem. The lemon is the supervisor receiving a bonus
for reporting a particular signal τ ′, differing from the true signal τ . It is impossible to
separate this supervisor from the others, when intending to report τ ′ instead of τ . But
payoffs are constructed such that the agent can never gain when collusion includes this type
of supervisor, as in the car market where trade fails due to the buyer’s inability to separate
lemons from good cars.
5.4 Benefits of Randomized Menus
When the signal is fully informative we can exactly quantify the gain from using one-sided
randomized menus, compared to a restriction to deterministic contracts. Recall that with a
fully informative signal the agent and the supervisor are symmetrically informed about θ,
and we can thus omit explicitly denoting τ . An SCF (x, t) thus only conditions on θ. By
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 any social choice function is implementable under collusive
supervision.
What happens when we restrict to deterministic contracts under collusive supervision?
A deterministic contract specifies for any (conforming) report on θ an alternative x(θ), a
transfer to the agent t(θ) and a wage to the supervisor w(θ). Side bargaining takes place
under symmetric information, i.e without frictions. Effectively, the coalition chooses the
(joint) report θr that maximizes their joint payoff u(x(θr), θ) + t(θr) +w(θr). Side payments
are used to split the cake to ensure each party receives at least their reservation utility
(given by truthful reporting in the grand mechanism). But then, the coalition acts as if it
was a single entity with preferences equal to the agent’s. It is well known that in this case
only SCFs can be implemented whose alternative selection x(·) is cyclically monotone.
Lemma 3. Under collusive supervision with a perfectly informative signal, and if only
deterministic contracts are used, an SCF (x, t) is implementable if and only if x is cyclically
monotone, i.e. if and only if for every sequence of length k ∈ N of types (θ1, . . . , θk) ∈ Θk
with θk = θ1, we have
k−1∑
l=1
u(x(θl), θl+1)− u(x(θl), θl) ≤ 0. (8)
A complete characterization of implementable SCFs under collusive supervision, i.e.
for arbitrary signal precision, when restricting to deterministic contracts is not available.
Celik (2009) provides an example with |Θ| = 3 and a binary signal that partitions the
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type space. He shows that even when only monotonic SCFs are considered (for which the
alternative selection x(·) can be implemented with some transfer rule t), there is an additional
‘coalitional information rent’ involved. It stems from the possibility of coordinating the
agent’s and the supervisor’s report and is in addition to individual rents due to unilateral
deviation. Hence, in Celik’s setting the signal cannot be obtained for free. Our Proposition 1
shows that using one-sided randomized menus allows for strictly reducing the information
rents in this example.
6 Extensions
This section provides several extensions to our baseline model. First, we introduce voluntary
participation and outside options for both the agent and the supervisor. Second, we discuss
an alternative timing assumption for our grand mechanisms. Third, we study various
alternatives for the supervisor’s (and the agent’s) preferences that appear in the literature,
such as limited liability and risk-aversion. Finally, we briefly analyze some aspects of
supervisory information (timing of information arrival, partially verifiable signals, hard
evidence), and discuss the underlying commitment assumptions in our grand mechanisms.
6.1 Voluntary Participation
In the previous section our focus was on implementation only: both the agent and the
supervisor were forced to participate in the grand mechanism. However, our results are robust
to the introduction of voluntary participation decisions, adding participation constraints to
the problem.
Regarding the agent we can allow for arbitrary type- and signal-dependent outside options
ū(θ, τ). To satisfy the agent’s outside option we now have to add the usual participation
constraints to the benchmark of direct supervision, implying that the agent’s utility in
every state (θ, τ) exceeds his outside option: u(x(θ, τ), θ) + t(θ, τ) ≥ ū(θ, τ). Note that the
one-sided randomized menus used to prove Proposition 1 implement (x, t) with the same
expected transfer to the agent. Consequently, the agent’s interim expected utility equals
u(x(θ, τ), θ) + t(θ, τ) and thus exceeds the value of his outside option in every state (θ, τ).
A sensible outside option for the supervisor is zero. Since the supervisor’s (expected)
wage equals zero in every state (θ, τ), she is willing to participate in the mechanisms we
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use for proving Lemma 2 and Proposition 1. In the same way, any weakly negative outside
option (that may also depend on the state (θ, τ)) does not affect our results. A strictly
positive outside option renders supervision costly, and thus drives a wedge between the
benchmark of direct supervision (where the signal is public and costless) and the cases
of non-collusive and collusive supervision, where the supervisor demands a net-payment.
Still, collusion has no bite, since any SCF that can be implemented under non-collusive
supervision (including the respective payments to the supervisor) is also implementable
under collusive supervision.
6.2 Timing of Collusion
We model collusion as a coordination of strategies used in the grand mechanism. This grand
mechanism, however, consists of two stages: first a deterministic contract is selected and
confidentially revealed to the supervisor, second agent and supervisor simultaneously send
their reports. Our timing assumes that collusion takes place between these two stages. This
implicitly assumes the mechanism reveals the information about the selected contract before
players have a chance to meet and engage in collusion. For instance, it is only when the
supervisor is sent to the agent in order to gather evidence that the two can collude, but at
this time the supervisor already knows her mission, and in particular all details about her
remuneration.
A conceivable alternative is to reveal the selected contract already before the supervisor
accepts the mechanism. With mandatory participation this variant is equivalent to our
main analysis, hence all results remain valid. Matters are slightly more complicated under
voluntary participation. Assume an outside option for the supervisor of v̄ ≤ 0, and the
following timing. First, a deterministic contract γ is selected from Γ according to q. This
choice is confidentially revealed to the supervisor who then decides whether or not to
participate. The agent decides whether to participate without receiving further information.
If both participate, the third party offers a side mechanisms and reporting proceeds as in our
main analysis. The crucial difference is that we have to ensure the supervisor’s participation
for every deterministic contract from the menu Γ, and not only in expectation. Hence, the
supervisor’s expected wage in every deterministic contract has to exceed the value of her
outside option. Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that all contracts γ1, . . . , γm are
constructed such that they pay weakly positive wages. Wages are negative only in contract
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γ0. Hence, the supervisor participates for all deterministic contracts from the menu Γ if
and only if she participates in contract γ0.
Furthermore, in our construction contract γ0 pays a deterministic wage. Increasing the
probability of contract γ0 lowers, in absolute terms, the (negative) wage paid in this contract.
Moreover, this wage converges to zero as q(γ0) converges to one, though it always remains
strictly negative. As a consequence, we find a one-sided randomized menu that implements
(x, t) without paying the supervisor in our adjusted timing, whenever the supervisor’s outside
option is strictly negative. When v̄ = 0 we cannot use negative wages but implementation
remains possible with (net-)payments to the supervisor which vanish in the limit, i.e. are
virtually zero.
Proposition 2. Consider the timing where the supervisor learns the selected deterministic
contract before her participation decision, and has outside option v̄. If v̄ < 0, Proposition 1
continues to hold. If v̄ = 0, there exists for any ε > 0 a one-sided randomized menu with
properties (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1, and
(iii′)
∑
i q(γi)wi(θ, τ, τ) < ε, and wi(θ, τ, τ) ≥ 0 for all (θ, τ) ∈ Θ× T .
In the proof of Proposition 2, for the case of v̄ = 0, we set all wages in contract γ0 to zero,
and thus satisfy the supervisor’s participation constraint for every deterministic contract
from the menu Γ. From her bonus payments in contracts γ1, . . . , γm, the supervisor now
earns a strictly positive wage in expectation over the entire menu Γ. But recall these bonus
payments under γ1, . . . , γm are ∆+ κ, and thus independent of the distribution q. Now let
the probabilities for these contracts converge to zero, i.e. let the probability of contract γ0
converge to one. This yields implementation with – in the limit – vanishing wage payments.
6.3 Preferences of the Supervisor
The literature on collusive supervision often assumes specific preferences for the supervisor
which depart from risk-neutrality.22 Any departure from risk-neutrality exacerbates the
implementation problem, because it makes lotteries costly, and/or prohibits (large) penalties.
22One reason is the common, but false, perception that collusion can easily be overcome in the case of a risk
neutral supervisor, as discussed for instance by Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003). This result, however, hinges on the
restrictions to i) a binary type space and ii) a single-crossing property of the agent’s preferences. If we dismiss
either assumption, even a risk neutral supervisor imposes severe limits on implementability: for the case of i) a
larger type space, we refer to Celik (2009) who considers three types, and for the case of ii) preferences violating
single crossing, see Lemma 3.
24
Nevertheless, one-sided randomized menus continue to mitigate the problem of collusion
even under a wide range of commonly used preference functions for the supervisor.
6.3.1 Limited Liability





w, w ≥ w̄,
−∞, w < w̄,
(9)
for some w̄ ≤ 0.23 When the supervisor is subject to limited liability, contracts cannot use
arbitrarily large negative wages. Similar to our discussion in the previous section, this is
problematic only regarding contract γ0 from our construction. As long as w̄ < 0, i.e. wages
can be negative (though not too negative), modifying the distribution q on Γ allows for
increasing all wages beyond w̄, and thus yields implementability. When w̄ = 0, negative
wages are ruled out per se, leaving no room for balancing the (strictly positive) bonus
payments to the supervisor. Hence, implementation without paying the supervisor is not
possible, but the supervisor’s expected wage can be made arbitrarily small.
Proposition 3. Suppose the supervisor is subject to limited liability. If w̄ < 0, Proposition 1
continues to hold. If w̄ = 0, the second part of Proposition 2 applies, i.e. any SCF (x, t) that
is implementable under direct supervision can be implemented under collusive supervision
with vanishing wages.
Effectively, limited liability imposes constraints which resemble participation constraints
as well as the adjusted timing of the mechanisms as studied in the previous section. Hence,
the proof of Proposition 3 mirrors that of Proposition 2.
6.3.2 Risk Aversion
We next consider a risk-averse supervisor. Formally, the supervisor’s utility US(x,w, θ) =
v(w) only depends on the wage (as before), but is not linear. To cover common examples
of risk-averse preference, we only assume v(·) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and
23As before, we rule out w̄ > 0. This case is not very different, but it requires adapting the benchmark of direct
supervision, since it is costly to hire the supervisor in the first place.
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satisfies v(0) = 0. The latter assumption is a normalization to stay in line with the direct
supervision benchmark.
In our baseline model, i.e. with mandatory participation, risk aversion imposes no further
restriction. The same mechanism used to prove Proposition 1 implements (x, t) even with
a risk averse supervisor and without paying any net wage. Note that after revealing the
selected deterministic contract to the supervisor, her outcome from every possible report is
deterministic, and hence reporting incentives are not affected by risk aversion. However,
the supervisor’s expected utility is strictly negative. She is subject to risk stemming from
the uncertainty in (Γ, q). Her expected wage is zero, hence her expected utility is strictly
negative by strict concavity of v(·).24
With both risk aversion and voluntary participation matters become more intricate. As
long as the outside option is strictly negative it is possible to design the mechanisms such
that there is only little randomness and hence risk preferences do not prevent implementation.
When the supervisor’s outside option is zero and she is risk-averse, implementation without
net payments becomes impossible, but implementation with vanishing wages is still possible.
Proposition 4. Suppose the supervisor is risk averse as specified above and has an outside
option v̄ ≤ 0. If v̄ < 0, Proposition 1 continues to hold. If v̄ = 0, the second part of
Proposition 2 applies, i.e. any SCF (x, t) that is implementable under direct supervision can
be implemented under collusive supervision with vanishing wages.
6.4 Preferences of the Agent
Regarding the preferences of the agent our model is less flexible. The agent’s transfer in a
one-sided randomized menu is stochastic, hence incentives are directly affected when the
agent is risk-averse with respect to monetary payments. Implementing a specific SCF (x, t)
therefore becomes more problematic. From the perspective of a principal, who designs
the mechanism to implement a specific choice rule x, we can nevertheless show that using
one-sided randomized menus allows for strictly reducing (expected) transfer payments as
compared to using deterministic contracts.
With regards to limited liability, our results remain unaffected when the limit is not too
24Note that we assume the supervisor cares about the sum of monetary transfers stemming from the wage
paid by the grand mechanism and side payments. Hence, the supervisor’s incentives basically coincide with the
risk-neutral case, since v(·) is strictly increasing.
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tight. The mechanism used for proving Proposition 1 uses penalties for the agent, but these
are not arbitrarily large and can hence still be used. Furthermore, our proof uses uniform
penalties simultaneously deterring all deviations. That is, we can alter these penalties in
two ways to meet limited liability constraints. First, we can use more nuanced deterrents
depending on the realized deterministic contract and reported state rather than the uniform
structure currently used, see eq. (12) in the Appendix. This allows targeting every potential
deviation separately, thereby requiring fewer and lower ‘penalties’ to the agent. Second,
we currently impose penalties even for reports which the agent would never unilaterally
deviate to (such as, in a single-crossing scenario, a high-cost type claiming to have low costs).
Here, again, a more subtle use of penalties in the presence of limited liability constraints
is possible. Furthermore, limiting the range of transfers to the agent still leaves enough
leeway to implement the SCF (x, t) with fewer wage payments to the supervisor as compared
to only using deterministic contracts. In particular, it is still true that implementation
may completely fail with deterministic contracts (as in our introductory example) but is
possible with some wage payments to the supervisor when using one-sided randomized
menus. A general answer depends on the specific assumptions imposed, regarding liability
limits, participation constraints as well as the agent’s utility function u(x, θ). We leave this
topic for future research.
6.4.1 An Interested Supervisor
So far we have assumed that the supervisor’s utility only depends on the monetary wage w
she obtains. That is, she did not have any preferences over the alternative x chosen, and her
preferences do not depend on the information state (θ, τ). The only reason for the supervisor
to forge a report therefore was stemming from the possibility of collusion, providing her with
either an increased payment from the grand mechanism or a bribe from the side mechanism.
In the case of an interested supervisor, and particularly with preferences over the chosen
alternative, the problem of additional incentives to misreport arises. The supervisor may
now even find unilateral deviations beneficial since these may cause the implementation of
more preferred alternatives, even if at the cost of a decreased wage.
To prevent such unilateral deviations, we can extend the logic of our one-sided randomized
menu to two sides. That is, we also endow the agent with payoff-relevant private information
vis-à-vis the supervisor. This way, the supervisor is uncertain about the value of both
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her unilateral deviation and possible collusive coordination. Effectively, the randomization
over a menu of deterministic contracts is revealed to agent and supervisor along different
dimensions. Again, we leave a more detailed analysis to future research.
6.5 Supervisory Information
As a final robustness check, we analyze three alternative assumptions regarding supervisory
information.
Timing of Information. In many applications the signal is observed only after entering
a contract. For instance auditors are first hired (i.e. endowed with a contract) and then sent
to gather information. Formally, this amounts to receiving the signal only after deciding
whether to participate in the grand mechanism. That is, asymmetric information of agent
and supervisor vis-à-vis the mechanism designer arrives only postcontractually. With such
an assumption all our results go through, many even get simpler to achieve, because the
supervisor’s participation constraint is weaker.
Partially Verifiable Information. Our model assumes the signal is soft information:
only cheap talk announcements regarding the signal are possible. In many realistic scenarios
there is some verifiability, for instance an auditor can present detailed accounts and verifiable
documents. As in Green and Laffont (1986), we can model (partial) verifiability by assuming
that possible messages after signal realization τ are a subset E(τ) ⊆ T .25 Effectively there
are fewer deviations to consider, and thus implementation becomes simpler to achieve.
Hard Information. Most work on collusive supervision assume evidence is hard.
Formally, the signal observed by the supervisor either conveys the agent’s true type θ or the
supervisor does not find evidence at all, i.e. the signal is ∅.26 The report can then be to
reveal the evidence, or to claim not having received any. We can capture such an evidence
structure as follows: let T = {τ1, . . . , τn, ∅} and assume πij = 0 for all i 6= j, as well as
πii ∈ [0, 1] and thus πi∅ = 1− πii ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, receiving signal τi is evidence for type θi.
In addition, the message set after having received signal τi is given by E(τi) = {τi, ∅}, while
E(∅) = {∅}, as in the previous paragraph on partially verifiable information. Consequently,
hard evidence is subcase of partially verifiable information with a specific signal structure,
and all our results go through also for this case.
25Because non-conforming reports are penalized there is no loss in assuming both players have the same evidence
set.
26See for instance Kofman and Lawarrée (1996b), Kessler (2004), as well as Burlando and Motta (2015).
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6.6 Commitment
When stochastic mechanisms are used, the literature generally assumes the designer’s ability
to commit to a distribution from which the outcome is drawn. Analogously, we have assumed
that a designer using one-sided randomized menus can commit to a distribution over the
menu of contracts. The only difference lies in the supervisor being privately informed about
the realized contract.
The mechanism designer (or principal) may not be indifferent between the different
outcomes in the support of a stochastic mechanism. The same holds true for a one-sided
randomized menu, where the designer may prefer some contract realizations over others.
In the introductory example of Section 3, for example, the firm prefers contracts γ1 and
γ2 over γ0 since the latter yields a large compensation to the manager at only small gains
extracted from the supervisor.
However, we can modify this mechanism such that the firm indeed is indifferent between




under contracts γ1 and γ2, irrespective of the report profile. This shift affects neither the
manager’s nor the supervisor’s optimal reporting strategies and does not open up more
room for side contracts. Hence, it only changes the equilibrium outcome in that the firm’s
expected total payments are now equal to 11 in each of the three contracts. Consequently,
the firm is willing to randomize between the three contracts as prescribed by q(·).
A similar logic can be applied to more general one-sided randomized menus. Recall the
construction of contracts used in the proof of Proposition 1: not knowing the realized signal
τ , all contracts γ1, . . . , γm are equivalent in expected revenue for the mechanism designer.
Only γ0 differs in that it extracts a payment from the supervisor and pays a compensation
to the agent. In order do without a commitment assumption, we hence have to match net
payments between these contracts. (Note that in equilibrium, all contracts in the menu
implement the same alternative x and we can hence ignore the designer’s preferences over
alternatives.) Contract γ0 was constructed such that the supervisor’s payoff is independent
of the report profile (θa, τa, τ s). For all other contracts, her payoff depends on the report
prescribed by the side mechanism and hence on her input to this side mechanism. We now
increase her wage for all contracts γ1, . . . , γm independently of the report by a constant such
that E[tl(θ, τ) + wl(θ, τ)] = E[t0(θ, τ) + w0(θ, τ)] ∀l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. In this way, we align the
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designer’s net payments across contracts, and thus achieve indifference. Note that adding
a constant to the supervisor’s wage affects her reporting behavior neither in the grand
mechanism nor in the side mechanism. The new mechanism implements (x, t), though with
positive expected wage to the supervisor. Consequently, there are no implementation issues
even under the relaxed commitment assumption. Whether or not there is a need for paying
the supervisor, i.e. whether there are collusive rents, remains an open question since there
may be other beneficial mechanisms in this scenario.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the issue of collusion when a supervisor is employed to extract the
information held by an agent. We use a mechanism design framework to analyze the
constraints which collusion puts on, first, the set of social choice functions which are
implementable and, second, the costs caused by rent payments to the colluding parties.
Previous literature almost exclusively focused on direct mechanisms (or a subset thereof) and
came to the conclusion that collusion impedes both implementability and rent extraction.
We show that neither result persists if more general mechanisms are used. In particular, we
introduce one-sided randomized menus which provide the supervisor with payoff relevant
private information vis-à-vis the agent. We thus endogenously create an informational
asymmetry between the colluding parties. Modeling their side agreements as a form of
bilateral trade, the introduction of such asymmetric information can cause a complete
breakdown of their bargaining. That is, no side mechanism can be found which departs from
the non-cooperative equilibrium and at the same time is incentive compatible, individual
rational and ex-ante budget balanced. When haggling over adequate bribes, the agent does
not know whether he faces a ‘lemons’ supervisor in the spirit of Akerlof (1970), who is
cheap to collude with but of little value for the agent. Our main result is that any social
choice function which can be implemented under direct supervision – that is, when the
supervisory information is public – is also implementable under collusive supervision. In
addition, extracting the supervisory signal is costless.
Our results prove robust to various model changes, in particular common assumptions
on the supervisor’s utility function, such as risk aversion, limited liability or voluntary
participation. For each of these scenarios, the social choice functions remain at least virtually
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implementable and at costs which vanish in the limit. It remains an open question, however,
whether the results also extend to the case of two-sided asymmetric information: while in
our model, ex ante information is nested along the hierarchy (i.e. the agent holds private
information vis-à-vis the supervisor, but not vice versa), there are situations where each of the
colluding party holds private information. This is particularly relevant in an auction setting
of two or more agents. It may well be possible to exploit the introduction of endogenous
asymmetric information in a way similar to the one presented in this paper, i.e. providing
each of the agents with additional payoff-relevant information he holds privately. In addition,
in our setting the supervisor’s preferences are independent of the information thought to
be extracted – that is, the agent’s type – and of the alternative chosen by the mechanism.
In a more general framework, each of the agents could have preferences depending on the
information state and the chosen alternative. Again, multi-sided randomized menus could
be used to extract each agent’s privately held information by injecting bargaining frictions
into the coalition. There may, however, well be other mechanism sharing the benefits of the
ones we propose. As the focus of this paper is on introducing a specific methodology and its
potential benefits, we leave the exploration of this topic for future research.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Follows directly from invoking the revelation principle. Note that
the SCF may specify any values x(θ, τ), t(θ, τ) for θ /∈ Θ(τ) – these events do not occur and
are thus irrelevant.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider a social choice function (x, t) which is implementable under
direct supervision. Let w̃ < 0, x̃ ∈ X , and t̃ < minθ,τ u(x(θ, τ), θ) + t(θ, τ)− u(x̃, θ). Define
a deterministic contract γ = (x, t, w) by




(x(θ, τ), t(θ, τ), 0), if τ = τ ′, θ ∈ Θ(τ),
(x̃, t̃, w̃), else.
The deterministic contract γ implements the SCF (x, t) if it exhibits an equilibrium where
both the agent and the supervisor report their information truthfully. Conditional on
the agent reporting truthfully, the supervisor prefers to do so as well since w̃ < 0. By
the definition of t̃ the agent does not want to unilaterally deviate to a non-conforming
signal-report. Implementability of (x, t) under direct supervision further implies the agent
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has no incentive to report any θ′ ∈ Θ(τ) different from his true type θ. Lastly, sending
report θ′ /∈ Θ(τ), while reporting τ truthfully, is not optimal by the definition of t̃.
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix a social choice function (x, t) that can be implemented
under direct supervision. For any (θ, τ) ∈ Θ× T , and all 1 ≤ l ≤ m and 1 ≤ k ≤ n define
∆kl(θ, τ) := u(x(θk, τl), θ) + t(θk, τl)− u(x(θ, τ), θ)− t(θ, τ), (10)
and define ∆ := maxl,k,θ,τ ∆lk(θ, τ). Assume without loss of generality ∆ > 0, since
otherwise the desired allocation was implementable without using the supervisor.
We next define a one-sided randomized menu (Γ, q) with Γ = {γ0, γ1, . . . , γm}. A simple
contract γi asks the agent to report a type θ
a ∈ Θ and a signal τa ∈ T , and the supervisor to
report a signal τ s ∈ T . Contract γl specifies for each report vector (θ
a, τa, τ s) ∈ Θ× T × T
an allocation xl(θ
a, τa, τ s), a transfer to the agent tl(θ
a, τa, τ s) and a wage to the supervisor
wl(θ
a, τa, τ s). For 1 ≤ l ≤ m define the simple contract γm as follows:
xl(θ













t(θa, τa)− y∆, τa = τ s = τl, θ
a ∈ Θ(τl),










∆+ κ, τa = τ s = τl,
0, τa = τ s 6= τm
0, otherwise.
(13)
Define the simple contract γ0 as follows:
x0(θ























a, τa, τ s) = −w0 (16)









χ > u(x̃, θi)− u(x(θi, τj), θi)− t(θi, τj), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m. (18)
Finally, let q(γ0) = 1− δ, and q(γi) = δ/m for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
We now prove a more general statement, allowing us to later on easily incorporate
settings where we have additional constraints such as limited liability, risk aversion or
interim participation (see Propositions 2 and 3). These settings will put a lower bound on
the parameter w0. Proposition 1 will follow from this statement.
Proposition A.1. Given an SCF (x, t), consider the one-sided randomized menu (Γ, q)
defined by eq. (11) to eq. (18).
i) ∀w0 > 0 ∃δ ∈ (0, 1) such that (Γ, q) implements (x, t) without net payments to the
supervisor,
ii) If w0 = 0, (Γ, q) virtually implements (x, t) without net payments to the supervisor for
δ → 0, i.e. ∀ǫ > 0 we have
∑
i q(γi)wi(θ, τ, τ) < ε for all (θ, τ) ∈ Θ× T .





Since w0, κ > 0 by assumption and ∆ ≥ 0, we know that δ ∈ (0, 1) as required. Note that
given the (Γ, q) is constructed such that, if agent and supervisor report truthfully, the
supervisor is indeed not paid in expectation: her expected payoff (prior to learning which
simple contract was drawn from the menu) is given by δ
m
(∆ + κ) − (1 − δ)w0 = 0. We
therefore have to show that (Γ, q) exhibits an equilibrium with truthful reports.
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First consider unilateral deviations. Obviously, (Γ, q) features a non-cooperative equi-
librium where the agent reports his type truthfully, and the supervisor reports the signal
truthfully. The latter receives a bonus only if both reports on the signal coincide, hence
given that the agent’s report is truthful the supervisor prefers to do so as well. Next consider
the agent. The payment −χ deters misreports of the signal, provided the supervisor reports
the true signal. Incentive compatibility of the menu
(
x(·, τ), t(·, τ)
)
for all τ implies the
agent also prefers to report his type truthfully.
In the remainder we show there is no feasible side-agreement impeding the non-cooperative
equilibrium. A side mechanism (w.l.o.g. direct) consists of a collection of probabilities pijkl,
where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is the agent’s report to the side-mechanism, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} is the
supervisor’s report to the side mechanism, and (θk, τl, τl) is the collective report to the
grand mechanism. Furthermore, there are probabilities pij
∅
for sending non-conforming
signal reports, where we do not have to distinguish exactly which individual reports are
sent, and which type the agent reports, as our grand mechanism does not distinguish either.







is the payment the agent (supervisor) receives after type report θi by the agent and a simple
contract report γj by the supervisor. Recall we can invoke a revelation principle on the
collusion stage, i.e. we can focus on side mechanisms inducing truthtelling of both agent
and supervisor. If the agent truthfully reports the true type, the supervisor’s expected bribe







where we omit the true signal τd in the shorthand notation since we consider a fixed signal
in the following. The agent’s expected bribe given truthtelling of the supervisor and his







In the following fix a true signal τd ∈ T observed by both the agent and the supervisor.
As private information, the agent knows his type θ, and the supervisor knows the simple
contract γ. Recall, πdi is the conditional probability that the agent has type θi when the
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the probability that the side-mechanism triggers a non-conforming signal-report when the
supervisor reports γj .
The supervisor, who knows that simple contract γd was selected, participates in the side
mechanism, whenever pdd(∆ + κ) + b
s
d ≥ ∆+ κ. Hence, in any incentive compatible and
individually rational side mechanism we must have
bsd ≥ (1− p
d
d)(∆ + κ). (24)
The following Lemma provides some necessary conditions for an incentive compatible
side mechanism.














k ∀j, k = 1, . . . ,m. (26)
Proof. The supervisor of type j = 1, . . . ,m prefers reporting truthfully, whenever
p
j




j (∆ + κ) + b
s
k, ∀ 0 ≤ k ≤ m. (27)
Similarly, the supervisor of type 0 prefers reporting truthfully, whenever
bs0 ≥ b
s
j , ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ m. (28)










j , and thus (25).
Similarly, adding (27) for j → k and k → j yields
(pjj + p
k















We continue the proof of Proposition A.1 i). From the supervisor’s incentive compatibility



















































Next consider the agent. When of type θi, the agent’s expected payoff from participating





































 (u(x̃, θi)− χ)
As explained above, the agent’s expected payoff is u(x(θi, τd), θi) + t(θi, τd) from playing
non-coperatively, that is from refusing to participate in the side mechanism. He thus
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where the second inequality uses
(i) u(x(θi, τd), θi) + t(θi, τd) ≥ max{u(x(θk, τd), θi) + t(θk, τd), u(x̃, θi) − χ} for all θk ∈
Θ(τd), by incentive compatibility of (x, t) and the definitions of x̃ and χ,
(ii) u(x(θi, τd), θi) + t(θi, τd) −max{u(x(θk, τl), θi) + t(θk, τl), u(x̃, θi) − χ} ≥ −∆ for all
τl and θk ∈ Θ(τl) by the definitions of ∆, κ and x̃,
(iii) ∆̄ := mini,d ∆̄(θi, τd) = mini,d χ+ u(x(θi, τd), θi) + t(θi, τd)− u(x̃, θi) > 0 by (18).
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Adding the lower bounds on the supervisor’s and the agent’s payments, in any incentive
compatible and individually rational side mechanism we have












































Following (25), and assumptions (17) and (18), all terms on the right-hand side of (31) are
non-negative. Hence, a side-mechanism is incentive compatible, individually rational and
ex-ante balanced budget, only if the right-hand side in (31) equals zero. The latter requires
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we get p0d = 1. Then p
0
j = 0 for all j 6= d and thus also p
j













k = 0 for all j, k 6= d, and thus
p
j







for all j = 0, 1, . . . ,m, we thus have pjd = 1
for all j = 0, 1, . . . ,m. We have thus shown that the only incentive-compatible, individually





1, l = d
0, otherwise,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and all i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In words, the side-mechanism commits both
players to report the true signal. Incentive compatibility for the agent’s type-report further
implies the outcome of the side mechanism corresponds to the non-cooperative equilibrium
outcome described above.
We thus have shown that the scf (x, t) is implementable under collusive supervision. As
argued above, the supervisor’s expected wage (before learning which simple contract was
selected) is zero. This concludes the proof of Proposition A.1 i).
Now consider the case w0 = 0. The above reasoning on individual and coalitional
truthtelling still applies, and this holds for all δ ∈ (0, 1). Crucially, the expected transfer to the
agent is t(θ, τ) for all δ. Regarding the supervisor’s expected wage, have
∑
i q(γi)wi(θ, τ, τ) =
δ
m
(∆ + κ) which converges to zero as δ → 0. Hence, the mechanisms implements (x, t) with
vanishing wage payments.
Continuing the proof of Proposition 1, we can now simplify the two-sided randomized
menu (Γ, q): since we have no constraint on the supervisor’s wage, we can set w0 = ∆+ κ
and obtain δ = m
m+1
. All simple contracts (γ0, . . . , γm) in Γ then are equally likely: q(γl) =
1
m+1
∀0 ≤ l ≤ m. The mechanism takes the form depicted in Table 1.
Proof of Lemma 3. We first show that, when (x, t) is implementable, then it is cyclically
monotone. Invoking a collusion-proofness principle, we can restrict to deterministic contracts
without collusion on the equilibrium path. Fix transfers (t1, . . . , tn) and wages (w1, . . . , wn)
that implement (x, t). Let (θ1, θ2, . . . , θk) be some sequence with θ1 = θk. The SCF is
implementable, thus in state θl+1 there is no side mechanism that commits agent and
supervisor to send joint report θl, making both at least as well off and one strictly better off.
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That is, for any b ∈ R with v(w(θl+1)) = v(w(θl) + b) we have u(x(θl+1), θl+1) + t(θl+1) ≥
u(x(θl), θl+1) + t(θl)− b. Since v(·) is strictly increasing, we have w(θl) + b = w(θl+1) and
thus
u(x(θl), θl+1)− u(x(θl+1), θl+1) ≤ t(θl+1)− t(θl) + w(θl+1)− w(θl)
Summing these inequalities from l = 1, . . . k − 1 yields
k−1∑
l=1
u(x(θl), θl+1)− u(x(θl+1), θl+1) ≤ 0
Using θ1 = θk, we thus have
k−1∑
l=1

















u(x(θl), θl+1)− u(x(θl+1), θl+1)
≤ 0,
which proves cyclical monotonicity.
To show sufficiency, notice that cyclical monotonicity is sufficient for implementing (x, t)
in the absence of supervision. Hence, setting w1 = · · · = wn = 0 also implements (x, t)
under collusive supervision.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof directly follows from Proposition A.1: consider the
mechanism (Γ, q) described above with the constraint that w0 = −v. For all simple contracts
γ1, . . . , γm, the supervisor’s wage is non-negative and hence weakly greater than v. For
γ0, she obtains just her outside option. Hence, she participates in the grand mechanism
irrespective of the realized draw from the menu. When v = 0 we get implementation with
vanishing wages, as in part (ii) of Proposition A.1.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof mirrors that of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof mirrors that of Proposition 2.
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